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CHAPTER I 
INTRODuctION: THE STRUCTURE OF MEDIATION 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In section A issues 
which relate to the structure of mediation are discussed. Some 
questions are'formulated which express at a general level the concerns 
prompting this study. The literature reviewed in this section suggests 
that the 1 i nk between communi cati on and med; at; on is important. There­
fore, in section"B, this link is explored more fully. In section C 
two hypotheses are formulated which represent the explicit problem to 
be analyzed in this investigation. 
A. The Structure of Mediation 
Mediation l is a term that has been used in various fields: the 
economics of labor relations, the study of international relations, 
and the sociology of interpersonal and intergroup relations. Within 
and between formal organizations (i.e. industrial firms and trade 
2unions) mediation can be studied with some degree of ease . In this 
formal context we tend, therefore, to see mediation as a sort of 
applied science based upon an accumulated body of tested knowledge, 
and we assume that one can 'train' a mediator, such that he knows 
when to enter a dispute, what to say, and when to say it. Much of 
the literature explicitly addressed to mediation appears in the 
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economics and sociology of collective bargaining. By and large t this 
literature assumes that the third party needs to be 'capable ' and 
'experienced' in mediation (Landsberger, 1956; Manson, 1958; Perez, 
1959)~ suggesting that the role of mediator can be passed on through 
a formal socialization process. 
However~ as one shifts to an examination of everyday or informal 
interpersonal behavior, while II mediation" likewise appears, it is 
much. less well-defined, and there seems to be scant systematic, em­
pirically based knowledge concerning it. Generally, there is no 
"official" assignment of the role of mediator in such social inter­
acti on and, if the ro 1 e is assumed by a thi rd party, it is often not 
done with self-conscious intent. Anecdotal evidence abounds. For 
example, I have seen a family member being brought into the dispute 
of tWQ other family members (receiving a barrage of information, 
opinion, communication) solely because he happened to go through the 
room in which the disputing parties were interacting. Further, I 
have observed couples and friendship pairs acknowledgin~ their desire 
to have another party present when confl i cti ng ; ssues ari se so that 
reconciliation is more likely. Douglas (1955) relates that the re­
cruitment of third parties to mediate interpersonal conflicts is more 
prevalent and perhaps more culturally prescribed outside American 
society. She states: 
3 
liThe Mi'ddl e Easterner, by soc; a 1 requi rement, cannot 
fight with his enemy until the two have first drawn 
; n a thi rd uni nvol ved person to intervene between them. 
Once the third party has been engaged -- as the anthro­
pol ogi st put it; II when the opponents feel hi s hand on 
the scruff of the neck" -- the fi ghti ng begi ns in earnest. 
The ,mere happenstance of the third party1s presence in 
the area -- and he may be anyone in the street who hap­
pens around in the vicinity of a pending fight -- places 
onus on him if he does not intervene and seek to bring 
a return to peacefu1 condi ti ons. II (p. 650) 
In anecdotal or documented cases, such as these, the ski11s and tech­
niques of interpersonal mediation are not likely to be the result of 
formal socialization. Rather, the "mere presence ll of a third party 
may affect the s i tuati on between contending parti es so as to serve 
objectively the function of mediation, irrespective of the aims and 
intent of the mediator. By virtue of his objective social location, 
a thirdparty, "G", may transform a relationship of sharp conflict 
between persons "A" and 118 11 into a more moderate "mixed motive" 
(Schelling, 1960)relationsh'ip wherein a mutually satisfactory set­
tl ement may 'be reac hed through i nterpersona 1 negot i a ti on .. 
In Sirrmel's (Coser, 1965) and Caplow's (1968) writings on coal­
ition formation, several functions of a third party in a triad are 
discussed. One such functi on is termed "tert; us gaudens II a'nd refers 
to a ~h; rd party who uses the confl i ct between the other two members 
of the triad to gain something for himself$ as both members com~ete 
for his support. "Tertius gaudens" has, in effect, been recently 
studied as the use of power advantage in interpersonal bargaining. 
Emerson's theory of exchange networks (1972) clarifies the structural 
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source of such power advantage, and Stolte's (1972) study produced 
evidence showing that actor A, by virtue of his central position. 
relative to actors Band C, and irrespective of his motives, did 
achieve through the bargaining process profit increases at the 
expense of actors Band C. 
But another function of a third party discu?sed by Sinrnel and 
by Caplow is mediation, where conflict between contending parties is 
resolved for the collective welfare rather than used for selfish ad­
vantage by the third party. If there is a structure of tertius 
gaudens, based largely on the presence, location and action of a 
third party, is there also a structure of mediation which can 1 ike­
wide be understood, in part at least, in terms of the presence, lo­
cation and action of the third party relative to the two disputing 
parties? Can we clarify at the theoretical and operational levels 
some important features of the structure of mediation? At a general 
level, these are two essential questions prompting this study. 
Some recent theory and research concerned wi th the"mere presence" 
of a third party upon the negotiation process provides some clues 
about the distinct characteristics of the structure of mediation. It 
will be useful to review several of the more significant contr; butions. 3 
Ofshe (1971), interested in the effectiveness of the:adoption of a 
pacifist strategy by one member of a competing pair in inducing co­
operative behavior, suggests that such effectiveness may, to some 
extent, be affected by the presence of a thi rd party in the, form of 
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the researcher or audience. Implicit or explicit role expectations 
undergirded by pay-off sanctions are used to explain third party 
effects upon effectiveness of a pacificist's appeal. In the same 
vein, Brown (1968) found that an audience (of peers), which Qbserved 
the bargaining behavior between two persons and which prOvided hum­
iliating feed-back to the naive party by expressing the belief that 
he appeared weak and foolish, served to increase retaliation on the 
part of the humi 1 i ated party. Blood (1960), concerned wi th t he res­
olution of conflict between marital partners, refers to the more 
objective and more rational behavior which the third party enables 
the couple to adopt. Cap10w (1968) suggests that an "audience ll is 
always present if it be only in the form of the "larger corrrnunity" 
and that the norms of this larger community serve continuously to 
monitor the interaction between any two parties, be they individuals 
or groups. 
Not only sociologists, but economists, for example, Young 
(1967) and Meyer (1960), explicitiy (but briefly) mention the pos­
sibility that the third party by his mere presence serves to mediate 
a bargaining relationship. 
liThe mediator is a catalytic agent. The mere presence
of an outsider, aside from anything he may say or do, 
will cause a change~ and almost certainly a change for 
the better, in the behavior of the disputing parties. 
Rudeness, irritation, and the habit of listening ..•. 
these are as vexing as the untenable arguments that 
accompany them. Progress has been made through the 
mediator'S presence, though that presence has brought 
nothing more than temperate speech." 
(Young, 1967, p. 10) 
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Further, Maggiol0 (1971) suggests that the intercession of a third 
party in a mediation situation "involves the bringing of disputing 
parties together, under circumstances and in an atmosphere most 
conducive to a discussion of the problem in an objective way for 
the purpose of seeking a solution to the issue or issues involved 
II (p. 10) 
B. The Importance of Communication . 
In addition to the structural features (i.e. features based 
upon the presence, social location, and action of a third party 
irrespective of his intentions) of mediation emphasized i~ the 
theory and research reviewed so far, some concern has centered on 
the part p1ayed by communication in the mediation process. Thus, 
for example, Maggiol0 (1971) has pOinted to the importance of cir­
cumstances which create an atmosphere conducive to objective, ra­
tional discussion. Several other authors have underscored as es­
pecially important this link between mediation and communication. 
Yager (1953) states: "From time to time the suggestion is made 
that such agencies (mediation) could accomplish their mission more 
effectively by approaching their work from the point of view that 
'communications' is the basic problem involved in disputes .... 11 
(p. 539). Yager goes on to differentiate 'communication l which 
involves the mechanics of idea exchange from 'communications' in­
volving general semantics. Thus, in the former, the mediator is 
concerned with information being passed (or blocked) in the com­
munication system. In the latter, the mediator is concerned with 
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the 'precision' of exchange of information which fluctuates because 
words are symbols and as such vary in meaning for each individual. 
Knowl es (1958), ; n hi s report liMed i a ti on and the Psychology of 
Small Groups" also distinguishes two levels of communication -- the 
objective and the subjective. The objective he describes as lithe 
intellectual level which deals with facts, economics and power re­
lationships". The sUbjective leve1 "deals with the subconscious 
emotional and vaguely felt problems of the groupll. (p. 780) The 
relevance of the latter problems is that they may be obstacles to 
the adoption or maintenance of an objective level of communication. 
This analysis ties in very closely with Yager's 'precision of exchange 
of information'. 
Th~ mediatbr, it is posited (solely by his presence) alters 
severa 1 of these aspects of communi cati on. Thus, the thi rd party 
may make for more temperate speech (Young, 1967), act as a sounding 
board for possible agreements, or serves to regulate corrrnunication 
exchange through what Yager calls the 'mechanics of idea exchange'. 
Moreover, the third party provides a common base for expectations, 
attitudes and interpretation of statements, a notion expressed in 
Yager1sidea of 'general semantics'. The third party, Blood (1960) 
suggests, serves to engender more objective, more rational behavior, 
a condition which seems close to Knowle's concept of 'objective' 
level of communication, where the third party presents himself as 
an outside party, interested in the validity of either party·s 
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contending position. As Maggiolo (1971) says: "Both parties seek to 
impress him with the validity of their position, cognizant that their 
expositions must be stripped of partisan trappings. Their appeal to 
him must at the very least appear logical rather than emotional II • 
(p. 13) Thus, the third party affects also the subjective level of 
communication which Knowles refers to. 
Independently, Yager and Know1es have arrived at quite similar 
frameworks concerning levels of communication and the importance of 
a mediator in facilitating effective communication. A third writer, 
Richard E. Walton, discusses a unique relationship between mediation, 
objective communication (in his term 'complex thinking ability to 
process information') and tension (stress). He suggests that the 
concept of stress is one of the keys to understanding effective col­
lective bargaining and mediation. Making use of the inverted-U 
hypothesis, he asserts that "an individual's capacity for complex 
thinking is altered in a curvilinear fashion as stress increases, 
and that therefore, the indi­
vidual IS maximum ability to 
integrate and to utilize in­
formation occur at some mod­
erate stress 1evelll • 
(Wa 1ton, 1969, p. 111) 
Ind i vi dua1 I S 

Capacity 

to Accurately

Send and Optimum Level 
Receive and 
Integrate
Information 
Relevant to 
Conflict 
Resolution 
of 
Tension 
high
'------...----
Tension Level 
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Relevant to our study is the idea that a third party can inflUence 
the level of stress. 
"If the threat is too low, there is no sense of urgency, 
no necessity to look for alternative ways of behaving
and no incentive for conciliatory overtures. 
At a higher threat level, say a moderate level, 
the person searches for and integrates more information, 
considers more alternatives, and experiences a higher 
sense of urgency in changing the situation~ 
At a high level of threat, the person's ability to 
process information and perceive aiternatives decreases. 
This can produce rigidity of positions and polarization
of adversaries. 1I 
(Walton~ 1969, p. 112, 113) 
There is thus reason to expect that the mediation process 
operates, in part at least, through facilitating the communication 
between disputing parties. While the complex dynamics of how 
mediation operates through communication are an interesting matter 
of theoretical speculation, our concern at this point is more limited. 4 
As we shall see more fully below, this study will limit its attention 
to a consideration of the effects of variation in the structure of 
mediation (i.e. the presence, social location and action of a third 
party) upon amount of communication between negotiators. 
C. Statement of the Problem 
This thesis will undertake a 1imited experimental examination 
of some structural aspects of mediation. In general, it will focus 
on the effects of several conditions of intervention by a third 
;party 	upon the negotiation process between two actors linked in a 
mixed motive relationship. 
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Third party intervention can be conceptualized in at least four 
different \AJays by varying this party's presenc'e, his display of concern, 
and his apparent tendency to coalesce with one or the other of the two 
bargainers. The four conditions of third party intervention chosen 
for this study are: 
1.) third party present, not concerned, non-coalescing. 
2.) third party present, concerned, appearing to coalesce 
with one bargainer. 
3.) third party present, concerned, not appearing to 
coalesce with either bargainer. 
4.) third party absent. 
The specific mode of operationalizing these conditions will be made 
clear in chapter II. First, however, several theoretical comments 
are in order. The discussion in Part A above suggested that the 
structure of mediation implies the presence, action and location 
of the third party relative to the two contending parties. Our task 
is to tap relevant dimensions of these broad structural aspects of 
mediation in a limited, manageable, and fairly precise way. We 
contend that the four variations listed above accomplish this task. 
The presence or absence of the third party as well as the display 
of concern or lack of concern are straightforward dimensions of those 
features of structure we have labeled presence and action, and these 
dimensions need not detain us. 
However, the third dimension, the appearance of coalition form­
11 
ation between the third party and one or the other bargainer is more 
complex. For mediation to occur, it may be crucial that the third 
party remain strictly impartial and non-partisan. (Caplow, 1968; 
Simmel ~ 1950, etc.) What we argue here is that the location of the 
third party, being equidistant between each bargainer or closer to 
one or the other, may be an important signal of either impartiality 
or partiality and may thus be an important structural dimension of 
third party intervention. 
In each of the first three conditions of third ~arty inter­
vention listed above the third party need not participate verbally. 
In the actura1 research sessions to be discussed below I have limited 
verbal interaction to the dyad members and have manipulated the rel­
ative position and activity of the third party. It is posited that 
each condition may be potentially mediating, serving to facilitate 
outcomes which are mutually satisfying to the parties concerned. 
Each condition may also affect the amount of comnunication between 
the dyad members, despite the fact that the disputing parties are 
unaware that intervention is intended. 
The issues advanced above suggest three hypotheses each comprised 
of two parts: 
1.) Condition 3, where the third party is present, concerned, 
but does not appear to coalesce, will produce: (i) a greater amount 
of communication; and (ii) increased conflict resolution, than 
condition 4, where no third party is present. 
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2.) Condition 3, wi11 produce more communication and more 
conflict resolution than will condition 2, where the third party 
is concerned, .but appears to coalesce. 
3.) Condition 3, wi-'l produce more communication and more 
conflict resolution than will condition 1, where the third party 
shows no concern with the bargaining. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
This chapter describes the method used to collect data for 
evaluating the three hypotheses listed above. It includes the fol­
lowing sections: (A) subjects, (8) experimental procedures, 
(C) independent variable, and (D) dependent variables. 
A. Subjects 
In all, sixty-four subjects participated in the research, serving 
in 32 different bargaining pairs. All the subjects were fema"e (as 
were the confedera tes and i.nstructors) and were students from vari ous 
high school and junior high schools i.n Thunder Bay, Ontario and 
Terrace Bay, Ontario. Subjects in ~rades nine and ten bargained with 
subjects in those grades; subjects in grades seven and eiqht barQained 
with subjects in grades seven and eiqht. 
The students volunteered to participate in what was described as 
a sociological experiment involving a bargaining game, in which they 
could win some amount of money. The amount of money was-not specified 
until the subjects were given instructions prior to bargaining. 
B~ Experimental Procedures 
During a given experimental session, subjects met for instruc­
tions outlining a game of negotiation. The game used was a modified 
13 
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version of a bargaining game used in a study "Bargaining Power Processes 
in Exchange Networks" (Stolte, 1972). A sample of the bargaining game 
instructions and profit schedules ;s included in the appendix (part 8). 
A subjact was unable to accurately assess the profit of his opponent. 
Both subjects were informed that a choice of 'no agreement' Would 
result in zero profit for both parties. (Bartos in Berger, et al., 
1972)5 It was explained that each subject would be competing against 
one other subject and that she had two hypothetical commodities which 
she could exchange for certain hypothetical commodities of another 
subject. Each transacted agreement was worth profit points to each 
subject and was potentia11y worth some amount of money to the subject. 
The subject was encouraged to maximize her profit points in relation· 
to her partner's," Each subject had a special 'profit ~~hedule,6 
which designated the possible profit points she could achieve by ex­
changing different amounts of her commodities in return for different 
amounts of the commodities which the other subject had to exchange. 
Each s~bject had access only to her own profit schedule. A bargainer 
had to obtain profit points greater than her partner's before she 
could compete for monetary prizes of $10.00, $a.aOand $5.00. In 
this case, if a bargainer felt that her partner was making more points 
than she \lIas in a transact; on she was encouraged not. to make an agree­
ment. 
Agreements were negotiated during a fifty-fiv-eminute experi­
mental session. Data showing the transactions made, .the time of 
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the transaction, and the profit points achieved were recorded by the 
subjects on the profit schedule forms. 
After five transaction periods (25 minutes) a confederate (from 
here on referred to as a third party) entered to remind the pair 
that the five-minute rest pe~iod was beginning during which the sub­
jects were to fiqure out their tota1 profit points up to that point, 
as well as to figure out the number of agreements that they had trans­
acted .. 
C. Independent Variable: Third Party Intervention 
From this point on, the fo11owing variations in third party 
'intervention took place:? 
1.) Control Third Party (Con): the confederate left the room 
immediately after the five minute rest period was over. 
2.) Unconcerned Third Party (Si1): the confederate remained. 
for the next 25 minutes. She involved herse1f in some other activity 
(i.e. reading a book, doing homework) at some distance from the bar­
gai~ing pair and showed no interest in the bargaining taking place. 
3.) Coalescing, Concerned Third Party (Coal): the confederate 
r.emained for the next 25 minutes. She took a position beside one 
subject (this was prearranged) and watched her bargaining schedule. 
4.) Non-coalescing, Concerned Third Party (NCC): the confeder­
ate remained for the next 25 minutes. She 'showed an interest in the 
bargaining taking place and positione,dherself equidistant from each 
bargaining party. 
-------
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The subjects, during the instructions, had been told that a 
. student mi ght come into see hoy! the game was pl ayed. As well, the 
third party would explain: (the experimenter) II 
asked me to watch how this game goes so that I can help her with 
the next session of students coming in". The subjects had signed 
up for different times in the day so they were aware that other 
sessions followed theirs. In the 5il condition, the third party 
IIwould say: (the experimenter) said that I could 
do some homework (or reading) .in here, as all the rooms are being 
used". The subjects al so knew that we were, in fact, short of rooms, 
so this reason was credible. 
All the subjects and the confederates were aware that they could 
not converse. The only two cases in which a subject spoke to a con­
federate brought out two distinct reactions to the Coal party. One·' 
subject who had the third party beside her commented that she did 
not like someone watching over her shoulder. The other subject who 
spoke to the third party, who was 'coalescing' with her, . brought on a 
reaction from the non-coalesced party -- "You're not supposed·to talk 
to her" -':" spoken more in a plea of 'she can't give you any help' 
than as a simple reminder of the rules of the game. Thus, in this 
one case, it ;s evident that the intended appearance of coalition was 
perceived. 
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D. Dependent Variables 
The experiment examined the effect of the independent variable 
discussed above on two dependent variables: 
l.} amount of communication in a bargaining relationship, 
measured in terms of the number of 'offers' made by the contending 
8part les ; · and 
2.) conflict resolution reached through bargaining, measured 
in terms of the number of mutually satisfying agreements reached by 
. 9 t he palr. 
E. Exoerimental Design Su~ary 

In summary, we have four conditions of one independent variable: 

1. absence of a third party (Can) 	 A t-(--~) B 
2. unconcerned third party (S11) 	 A ( ) B 
~/
C 
3. 	 coalescing, concerned third A( ) B 
party (Coal) ~t 
C 
4. 	 non-coalescing, concerned A( 7B 
third party (NCe) ~/
c· . 
(See page 18 for key to above diagrams) 
-----------------
; 
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1"---------------­
Note: 
( indicates communication between the bargaining parties 
) indicates concern shown by the third party for the subject to 
whom the arrow is directed 
I indicates no concern shown 
by the third party for the 
bargaining of the particular 
party 
The overall ~xperimental design is portrayed in figure A. There 
are four conditions of the independent variable (third party inter­
vention): Can, Sil, Coal and Nee. Eight different pairs of subjects 
bargained under each of these four conditions. Of the pairs, one 
member u~ed the IAI profit schedule; the other member used the IBI 
profit sched~le. 
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION 
Can Sil Coal Nee 
APOSITION 
-use.of various 
profi t schedu 1 es 
B 
! 
! 
I 
i 
I 
r 8 8 8 8 
l 8 8 ~ 8 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Number of Offers 
Number of AgreementsFigure A: Overall Design 
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The following three hypotheses were tested: (A) the NCC condition 
will result in the greater amount of communication and in more agree­
ments in relation to the Con condition; (8) the NCC condition will 
result in a greater amount of communication and more agreements in 
relation to the Coal condition; and (C) the NCC condition will result 
in a greater amount of communication and more agreements than the 
Sil cond i ti on. In Band C we are qual i fyi ng the term "mere presence" 
and we are suggesting that the third party must behave in a certain 
way (concerned and non-coalescing) before there will be a significant 
increase in communication and agreement. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
In this chapter we present and discuss the experimental findings. 
Part A provides the findings on communication followed by the findings 
on conflict resolution. A consideration of the relation of "repeti­
tions" to communication is incorporated in the interpretation of 
findings in part B. 
A two-way analysis of variance was done on all data to c~mpare 
the behavior of A with B under each condition. Since A and B receive 
similar treatment under all conditions, with the exception of Coal 
condition, we do not expect any significant difference between the 
two parties. If there is any difference we would expect it to be 
accounted for by the Coal condition. 
Having randomly assigned individuals to conditions we presume 
that the pairs in all conditions are alike. However, we have the 
pre-treatment data on hand and therefore we will consider the 'change ' 
that occurs from the first half to the second half of the bargaining 
game. In the future, whenever we are dealing with this change it 
will be referred to as "change over time". . 
A. ( i ) Commun i cati on: Number of Offers 
In 	 a two-way analysis of number of offers (second half) we find 
20 
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no significant effect of treatment (third party intervention), no 
significant effect of position (IAI or '8' position), and no sig­
nificant interaction effect. (See Table 1.0 and Figure 8)11 However, 
there is a notable variation between conditions. Con condition re­
sulted in the least mean number of offers while NeC had the greatest 
mean number of offers, followed by 5il condition, then the Coal con­
dition. 
In a two-way analysis of the change in number of offers over 
time, while there is no significant effect of position nor any sig­
nificant interaction effect, there is a significant effect of treat­
ment (p<.05). (See Table 2.0 and Figure C) This finding suggests 
that the behavior of the third party does have a definite effect on 
the change in amount of communication. 
A Neuman-Keuls multiple comparison was done on the data to de­
termine where the significance lay. NCe condition was found to be 
significantly different from both the Can condition (p<.05) and the 
Coal condition (p<.05). The Sil condition was not significantly dif­
ferent from any condition. 
The definite order that is portrayed by these two analyses gives 
some support to the prediction that the NCC condition will result in 
the greatest amount of communication. It also suggests that a third 
party, irrespective of the presence or absence of concern and/or 
coalition, will result in a greater amount of communication than the 
condition in which there is no third party. 
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Having found a significant effect of conditions on the change in 
number of offers over time, and an obvious difference between conditions 
in the number of offers made after the third party has entered the bar­
gaining situation, I would be tempted to suggest that the hypotheses 
suggested earlier in this paper are finding some support. The NeC 
condition increases communication significantly more than the Goal and 
Can conditions. However, simply having a third party in the room in 
which the bargaining takes place (i.e. 5il condition) is insufficient 
to increase communication significantly. The closer positioning of 
and the concern shown by the NCC third party appears to be necessary 
before the desired change in communication can be effected. 
A. (ii) Conflict Resolution: Number of Agreements 
An increase in communication does not necessarily imply' resolu­
tion of conflict as was posited in chapter I. If the number of agree­
ments reached also increases in the same manner as number of offers 
(or 'change ' in number of offers), then the findings on the communica­
tions aspect would be more relevant to the prior theoretical analysis. 
It would give a firmer basis for 'tentatively' predicting that the 
presence of a NCC third party, ~ increasing communication between 
bargaining parties, increases the number of agreements (thus facilit­
atingthe effectiveness of the bargaining process). 
When we look at the mean number of agreements for conditions 
(6.875, Can; 6.375, Coal; 5.75,5;1; and 7.0, NeG) the case presented 
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above seems to hold for the Nee condition. (See Figure D) However, 
the difference in number of agreements between conditions comes nowhere 
near significance. (See Table 3.0) One wonders whether a third party 
merely results in an expenditure of energy (communication) which is 
uncalled for in light of resolution of conflict. 
B. Interpretation 
Since the number of agreements do not vary significantly between 
conditions then it may be that the increased communication ;s merely 
(i) a reflection of the repetition of a 'staunch' position or (ii) a 
reflection of movement into areas (possible agreements) which are more 
and more disagreeable to the other party than earlier offers. This 
may reflect a decision to avoid agreement while at the same time 
'masking' thi~ position (decision) by an appearance of 'trying to 
agree' -- in the form of increased communication. However, it is 
important to note that all conditions were nearing the limit in number 
of ~greements. Thus, a more accurate analysis of effect6f conditions 
on resolution of conflict may have been stifled by the structural 
limitation set on number of agreements .. 
If the large number of offers in the NCC condition is due to 
the adoption of a 'staunch' position, this may be reflected in the 
number of repetition of offers. Considering each pair of subjects, 
the correlation coefficient between number of offers and number of 
repetitions is .796 (Pearson Product Moment). This value for a 
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;:a 
sample of this size is significantly different from zero at a 1% con­
fidence level. However, despite the magnitude of this correlation, 
we cannot confidently say that the repetitions alone result in increased 
communication. If we look at the percentage of the change in number of 
offers that is accounted for by a change in number of repetition of 
offers, we find that repetitions are not as significant in explaining 
increase in number of offers as we might have first assumed. All of 
the increase in offers in the Con condition can be accounted for by 
the increase in repetitions~ 72% in the 5i1 condition, and 45% in the 
Coal condition. Only 40% of the increase in offers in the Nee condi­
tion can be accounted for by an increase in repetitions. 
In this case it may be enlightening to consider the difference 
between conditions in number of offers when any repetitions of 
offers have been exc1 uded. Thus, we set up what wi 11 from here on 
be"termed number of offers (modified)'. The 'modified ' means thatI 
for each transaction period, only original offers were included. Rep­
etitions of this original offer were excluded from consideration. 
If the Nee condition has a significantly greater nu~ber of non­
repeated offers (even though it has a high level of repetitions) then 
the explanation of a 'staunch' position is less tenable to explain the 
fact that NCe condition does not have a significantly greater number 
of agreements. The above consideration of percentages of increase in 
offers accounted for by increase in repetitions hints that this is 
likely to be the case. 
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In this analysis (number of offers: modified) and in the follow­
ing analysis (change in number of offers (modified) over time) we find 
no significant effect of position nor any interaction effect. In this 
case~ only the effect of conditions will be referred to. There is a 
significant effect of conditions on number of offers (modified). (See 
Table 4.0 and Figure E) A Neuman-Keuls multiple comparison shows that 
NeC is significantly different from Con (p<.05). 
Similarly, considering the change in number of offers (modified) 
over time, there is a significant effect of conditions. (See Table 
5.0) Again, NCe is significantly different from Con (p<.05). NCC 
increases the number of non-repeated offers from first to second half. 
Can, on the other hand, tends to decrease the number of non-repeated 
offers. Since the NCC condition does, in fact, result in more Inon­
repeated 1 (original) offers than the other conditions, we cannot use 
the explanation involving the adoption of a staunch pOSition to recon­
cile the findings on communication and agreements. 
It is important to note that prior to the research done it was 
assumed that if communication was increased there would be a cor­
responding increase in the likelihood of agreement. We assumed that 
in the case of mediation the maintenance of communication which occur­
red was associated with all the good aspects of reaching agreement. 
However, in our research, we found there 'was little difference between 
conditions in the mean number of agreements made, despite the signifi­
cant difference in communication. While this may have resulted from 
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the ceiling set on number of agreements, it is not so easy to explain 
one further finding. The correlation between number of agreements and 
number of offers (r = .21) and between number of agreements and number 
'of offers (modified) (r = .09) illustrate that number of agreem~nts 
has little if any relation to number of offers (corrmun;cat;on). It 
might be possible that the restriction of 'communication l to number of 
offers does not a.llow us to consider other verbal corrmunication, (i .e. 
"You're crazy.lI, "11m starving. lI ) which would be more informational 
to the subjects and which might have some effect on the reaching of 
agreements. 
It is well to consider Krauss &Deutsch1s (1966) corrments which 
.suggest that such a situation is quite possible.. lilt is a common 
belief that corrmunication between parties in conflict will reduce thei'r 
~onflict. Of course, it ;s true that conflic~ can seldom be reduced 
in the absence of communication. However. this should not be taken 
to imply that communication will perforce lead to conflict resolution. 
Conflicting parties can communicate threats as well as offers of con­
cili~tion. and communication can, under certain conditions, serve to 
intensify confl ictinstead of arnel iorating it. 1I (p. 572) 
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TABLE 1.0 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE OF NUMBER.OF OFFERS 

Source df S.S. m.s. F 
Treatment 3 46'92.69 1564.23 2.388 
Position 95.06 95.06 .15 
( I AI or I BI) 
Interaction 3 55.19 18.4 .03 
Error 56 36682.0 655.04 
TABLE 2.0 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE OF CHANGE IN 
NUMBER OF OFFERS 
Source df S.S. m. s F 
Treatment 3 2636.05 878.68 2.98 * 
,Position 1 .02 .02 .00005 
'Interaction 3 201 .55 67 ~ 18 .228 
, Error 56 16514.125 294.9 
*The effect of treatment is significant -­ (p<. 05). 
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Source df s.s. m.s. F 
Treatment 3 7.75 2.58 .26 
Error 28 278.25 9.94 
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TABLE 4.0 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE OF NUMBER OF 
OFFERS (MODIFIED) 
Source df S.S. m.s. F 
Treatment 3 2547.92 849.31 3.65 '* 
Position 112.89 112.89 .48 
Interaction 3 64.3 21.4 .09 
Error 56 13045.88 232.96 
*The effect of treatment ;s significant -- (p<.05) . 
TABLE 5.0 ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE OF CHANGE 
IN NUMBER OF OFFERS (MODIFIED) 
Source df 5.5. m. s. F 
Treatment 3 1146.38 382.13 3.07 * 
Position 1 10.56 10.56 .09 
Interaction 3 176.81 58.94 .47 
Error 56 6950.25 124. 11 
*The effect of treatment is significant -­ (p<. OS) 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
A. Summary and Conc1usions 
I began this study by suggesting that the 'mediation' situation 
of thi rd party i nterventi on caul d be analyzed \vi th a focus on the 
structural element involved, in much the same way that Emerson (1972) 
and Stolte (1972) had studied the 'tertius gaudens' situation. 
By manipulating the presence or absence of a third party, of 
concern~ and of coalition$ four conditions of third party intervention 
were conceptualized and incorporated in the research design: 
1.) present, not concerned, non-coalescing (Sil) 
2. ) present, concerned, appeari n9 to coalesce (Coal) 

3.) present, concerned, not appearing to coalesce (NCC) 

4.. ) not present (Con) 

Based on ideas presented by various authors in the areas of 

collective bargaining, mediation t communication and social control 
I hypothes i zed that th.e Nce condi ti on woul d effect a grea tor amount 
of communication and of conflict resolution in relation to the Coal 
and Silconditions as well as in relation to the Con condition in 
which .there was no third party present. 
Based 	on the finding of a significant variation in amount of 
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communication between conditions I feel confident in suggesting that 
there is, as in Itertius gaudens', a structure of mediation, which 
can"be understood in terms of the presence, location and action of 
the third party relative to the disputing parties. 
In light of the experimental findings, it seems fairly clear 
that a third party who is concerned with (or interested in) the bar­
gaining which is occurring and who remains neutral (shows no tendency 
to coa1 esce) wi 11 "cause ll (or be rel ated to) an increase in communi ca­
tion -- an increase which would not occur had no third party been 
present. 
However, resolution of conflict is another matter. It seems 
that a third party has little differentia' effect on the resolution 
of conflict (in the form of reaching agreements). It is possible" 
that our assumption that an increase in communication would lead to 
resolution of conflict is based on a prior, and incorrect, assumption 
that communication is the exchange of 'true l information and is an 
indication of Igoodwilll, in a sense. As Krauss &Deutsch (1966) 
pointed out, this is not necessarily, nor"even likely, to be the 
case. 
Therefore, unlike the case involving communication, I cannot 
confidently say that the mediator by his 'presence l ;s a catalytic 
agent as regards conflict resolution. It appears that by increasing 
communication "he just makes the conflict more verbally apparent. 
The resolution (agreement) that is reached when the mediator is present, 
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despite variations in his location and activity, seems likely to 
have been reached in the same amount of time without him present. 
B. Suggestions for Further Research 
Several areas of study present themselves as interesting for 
future research. While a definite trend is apparent in the findings 
of this research, it is quite possible that the findings would not 
~old up under another set of subjects. The restriction of this 
research to females within a particular age range, while limiting 
the degree to which we can generalize our findings, presents itself 
as a challenge. Studies involving males, various age categories, 
ethnic backgrounds, etc. may provide much needed insight into inter­
personal bargaining. 
Further, since individuals come into contact with- numerous 
other individuals in their day-to-day living, their behavior when 
in interaction with one person is likely to be affected by their 
prior experiences. An interesting extension of this research would 
be to analyze the differential effect of third party intervention. 
when subjects bargain with more than tine person (i.e. after bargain­
with one subject, the subject bargains with a second subject under 
the same third party condition or under a different condition). Var­
ious combinations of third party intervention could be appropriately 
incorporated 	in the study. 

\~hi 1 e the research envi si oned by these suggest; ems appears 
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feasible on the basis of the experimental procedures of this study, 
its (the research's) actualization is admittedly contingent upon 
the evolution of a more elaborate theoretical base, and, therefore, 
must be a1located to the more distant future. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The dIIconcept, me ;at;on", as commonly defined, "includes three 
aspects: 

"1.). to ~ccupy an inte~m~diate place or position; esp., to form 

a connectlng 11nk or a transltlonal stage between other things; 

2.) to act between parties in order to effect an agreement

compromise or reconciliation; - - , 
$.) to effec;:t(a re~ult), convey (a gift), communicate (knowledge),
etc., as or by an 1ntermedl ary or med; urn. II 
(Italics mine)
(New Century Dictionary, p. 1035, 1036)
A study of mediation in labour relations research might em­
phas~ze the second aspect -- the facilitation of an agreement, com­
promlse or reconciliation. 'This study, which takes a sociological 
tack, on the other hand, will be mainly concerned \-lith tloccupancy of 
a position" and "communication ll as these aspects may affect "reconcil­
iation ll • 
2 By ease I refer to the fact that someon~ has been explicitly
assigned the role of 'mediator' and therefore we can clearly observe 
his actions as mediator. 
3 There is one further area of study that is especially concerned 
with the influence that a third party might produce on behavior, al­
though the concern is not limited to Ithird party' intervention but 
is extended to the more general 'added party' intervention. This' 
area of study deals with methods of research and with obtrusive be­
havi or on the part of the researcher (Lei k, 1972; Webb, Campbell,
Schwartz &Sechrest, 1966). These writers acknowledge that a researcher 
can produce what Webb et ale term Ita guinea pig" effect. My research 
(as well as analyzing the substantive problem of the structure of med­
iation) is also related to methodological studies of this 'guinea pig' 
or 'observer' effect. 
4 In an attempt to gain some insight into t~ese complex dynamics, 
I have taken Walton's model of mediation, communication, and tension 
and conside,red, it in light of several ideas and findings presented by
Schacter (1951) and Emerson (1966). See appendix (part A) for this 
analysis. 
, I 
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•5, Among the assumpti ons upon which thi s 9ame is based are those 
outllned by Bartos, 1972. As he puts it, 11(1) a person must choose 
one.course of ~ction from among several mu~ually exclusive courses 
avallable to hlm, wherein each course of action leads to particular 
outcomes; (2) he has preferences among these outcomes; (3) he is 
motivated to try to obtain preferred outcomes; and (4) no social or 
~ersonal restrictions on his level of aspiration are present thatt 
1S we assum~ that actor is motiv~ted to maximize personal gain and 
not bound [In- the instructions] by considerations such as "one must 
try to obta,in only what is proper to one's position ll (Bartos, 1972.• 
p. 21). 
6 Subjects using the IAI profit schedule (from here on referred 
to as A subjects) met together for standardized general instructions, 
as did subjects using the 'B' profit schedule (from here on referred 
to as B subjects). Subjects had been randomly assigned to position 
A or B prior to the experimental session. ­
7 Subjects had been randomly assigned to conditions of third 
party intervention prior to the experimental session. Eight sessions 
of each of the four conditions of the independent variable were run 
successfully. No subject participated in more than one session. 
8By 1imit-jng our analysis of communication to 'number' of offers I 
we are putting very strict binds on the abstract term 'commonication'. 
In the recorded bargaining sessions we have available a myriad of 
ve~ba1 communications (i .e. "No way. II "Are you crazy?", III have a 
tri be to feed, you know. 1\, IIWhat I s the matter -~ you got money 
problems?") -- all this, which we are not making use of, but which 
could plausibly be affected by third party intervention. We are ' 
already limited in that the taperecording cannot convey any physical
communication. - As well, it is quite possible that the 'number of 
offers' setup is less likely to be affected by third'party interven­
tion since the comments were task-oriented while the other verbal 
communi ca ti on portrayed more of the I emoti onal' i nformati on of the 
communication. However, within the confines of financial and time 
limitations the use of 'number of offers' is a manageable and relatively 
consistent indicator of amou'nt of communication. 
9We are assuming that if an agreement is reached that it is 
satisfying to both parties in comparison to a choice of Ino agree­
ment I.. 
10The term Isecond half' refers to the bargaining, offers, agree­
ments, etc., which occur after the third party has arrived (i.e. the 
second half of the bargaining game). 
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11All tab1es and figures referred to in this chapter are found 
at the end of this chapter. 
/ 
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APPENDIX 
PRE-EXPERIMENTAL RATIONALE 
A. 	 Schacter, Emerson, and Walton: A Model of Mediation t 
Communication, and Tension. 
While the three writers, Yager, 1953, Knowles, 1958, and W~lton, 
1969, made explicit connections between communication, bargaining 
and mediation, their approach has diverged from the more traditi'onal 
bargaining studies which dot the field of group dynamics and YJhich' 
brought into the limelight such writers as Caplow and Gamson. ' In 
the area of group dynamics have been other writers who, while not 
concerned with bargainlng per se, did concern themselves with matters 
such as social influence and social control ... areas whic~ seem' 
tenuously re1ated to bargaining but which in fact underly much of the 
work in the area of ,bargaining, coalition and power processes. Itis 
with these studies which we will concern ourselves in this sectirin, 
for they have a place in the clarification of mediation and bargain­
; ng process. 
Schacter's study HDeviation, Rejection and' Communication", as 
you may recall, dealt with groups of students who were brought to­
gether to form var; DUS cl ubs. On thei r' fi rst meet; ng they were 
asked to help the experimenter solve a problem presented in the for~ 
7""'­of a 'Johnny Rocco l case the story of a juvenile delinquent now 
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awaiting sentence-for a crime he is purported to have comnitted. One 
of the group members was a confederate ~ho disagreed with the-members' 
decision on what treatment Johnny Rocco was to receive. He maintained 
this 'deviant' position in relation to the other group members through­
out the experiment. Another confederate, the 'slider'also took this 
devian~ position but let himself be influenced and ~radually accepted 
the group norm. Schacter measured rejection of the deviates in the 
form of nominations to committees and sociometric tests. He also 
recorded the communication that occurred in the group discussions. 
The following findings are relevant: 1.) strong rejectors 
reach their peak of commuryication towards the deviate at .about the­
15 to 25 minute mark (of a 45 minute discussion); 2)mild rejectors 
'peak' somewhat later; then decline, and; 3.) non-rejectors, generally 
reach their peak latest, near the end of the session. The same re~ 
lationship between the three types of rejectors held but at a differ­
ent leve.l of communication depending on what combination of two var­
iables characterized the groups: (a) the degree of-cohesiveness, . 
and (b)·the relevance of the issue. 
By combining the levels of these variables we end. up with four 
types of groups: 
1. highcohesive,relevant issue (HiCoRel) 
2. low cohesi~et relevant issue (LotoRe1) 

3..: high cohesive, irrelevant issue (HiColrrel) 

4. low cohesive, irrelevant issue (LoColrrel) 
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It is not too far-fetched to assume that the group made up of a 
marital pair, or the group comprised of family members, would ba 
characterized by high cohesiveness and that if a dispute or conflict 
were to arise it would concern a relevant issue (at least it would 
be relevant as perceived by the participating parties). Therefore, 
the group is characterized by the first designation (HiCoRel). The 
labor-management combination is likely to be less cohesive, but to 
be characterized by concern with relevant issues and therefore would 
fit the second type (LoCoRel). 
In the research reported in this thesis the pairs appear largely 
·to be 'low cohesive l and the issue, 'irrelevant' . However, some of 
the pai.rs were composed of girlfriends and thus may be highly. cohesive. 
Also, the intensity with which bargaining took place suggests that 
the issue may have been more relevant than was original1y·thought. 
Thus, the paired subjects probably encompassed all of SchaGter's types: 
HiCoRel. LoCoRel, HiColrrel, LoCoIrrel. 
The pattern found in Schacter ISS tudywas especially pronounced 
in the HiCoRel condit1oh. However, the relationship between time and 
amount of communication holds for all ·four types of groups. 
When ·two people are in dispute over some issue, each one con­
siders the other to be the deviate. Each will attempt, as did the 
members of Schacter's groups, to minimize .the differences between 
himself and the other, and one way of doing this is by corrmunicating 
s 5 
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so as to change the opinion of the other toward the issue involved. 
I assume that there is some value in achieving agreement, whether it 
be best explained in terms of Schacter's concept of 'validation of 
socia1 reality' (a1so Festinger, 1950), in terms of Lewin's 'movement 
toward a group goal' (Lewin, 1951), or in terms of Homans' 'maximiza­
t; on of proftt I (Homans, 1961). 
So long as communication is maintained, agreement ;s still a 
possibility. Schacter found that after 15 to 25 minutes the amount 
, 
of communication directed toward the deviate reached its peak t after 
which time it decreased. He suggests that the cOl11Tlunicator perceived 
that there was little if any chance that the d~viate would change his 
opinion, and, therefore, that one was wasting his time attempting to . 
irifluen~e him. Homans! analysis is especially relevant here. He' 
would say that when an activity (communication) fails to be rewarded 
or reinforced "(opinion of the deviate did not change) it is likely 
to be stopped. (Homans, 1961). 
The question now is 'Why do we rely on communication for agree­
ment or for resolution of a dispute?1 For this answer we turn to 
work by Emerson (1966) on I negati ve .feedback I. We have mad·e the 
assumption that for €ffective mediation and thus effective bargain­
ing there must be a desire on the part of both parties to maintain 
or achi eve. agreement. Whether their 'cotTmon interest 1ies in the 
desire to avoi~ 'world destruction' on the international level, or 
the lavoidance of strike' on the industrial level, or the 'maintenance 
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of marriage' (or friendship) on the interpersonal level, there is, in 
fact, this common end -­ this 'group goal' (in Lewin's term). So 
long as this goal remains visible and possib1e, activity will be di­
rected at its achievement. 
I Negati ve feedback " amounts to toyi ng wi th the 'certainty I of 
achieving the group goal. Emerson found that one means of mobi1iz­
ing energy to achieve a goa1, was to make the goal outcome uncertain. 
That is, the greater the uncertainty of goal outcome, the greater 
the energy mobilization. 
In our context, if the dyad members were certain of reaching 
agreement or certain of failure they would not be concernedwfth 
energy mobilization. It is at this point that the mediation.proces~ 
begins to be relevant. 'Negative feedback' refers to the contribu~ 
t; on of ; nformat; on which is opposi tei n its effect on the members' . 
attitudes toward goal outcome. If one dyad member makes an optimistic 
remark, the other dyad member makes a pessimistic one. A sta1emate 
exists when both dyad members are contributing pessimistic remarks. 
(When both are optimi st; c they are presumably about to agree.) 
We will assume that when one or both members decide to stop 
their communication, that their level of certainty of not achieving 
the group goal ;s very high. To the extent that a third party can 
r 
provide negative feedback or can provide incentive for the dyad 
members to provide it, he is manipulating the uncertainty of outcome 
in .away that mobilizes energy for the accomplishment of the group 
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goal. 
It is well to note here the previous suggestion that the mere 
presence of a third party may have the effect of getting the dyad' 
members to communicate at an effective level. What we are testing 
in the research reported here is this 'incentive' for the dyad members 
to communicate on the basis of the Imere presence I of the third party. 
It is interesting that Walton ' s (1969) tension-productivity di­
mension be used in the context of collective bargaining and media­
tion, for the concept of uncertainty and energy mobilization (negative 
feedback) appears very similar to this dimension. Not too distant 
also is the communication paradigm just illustrated in Schacter's 
consideration of deviation, rejection and communication. While not 
incorporating exactly the same dimensions, these approaches do. appear 
interrelated~ It is plausible that certainty of goal outcome and 
tension reflect a similar dimension and that in the context of a 
dispute, communication is the medium by which the level of certainty 
or tension is made known. Communication is a visible reflection of 
capacity for complex thinking as well as an indication that energy 
has been mobilized. (See diagram be'low) 
Capacity 
for 
Complex
Thi.nki ng 
High1.-----­
Tension 
(Wa 1 ton, 1969) 
·AmountAmount of
of Corrrnunication
Energy to theMobil­ \ Deviateization ' \ 
I Low
"-------
High 
; T
. I 

I 

Time 
'. 

Certainty (Schacter, 1951)(Emerson, 1966) 
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Keeping tha above ideas in mind, we find that several aspects of 
third party 'presence l seem to parallel those of active third party 
intervention and seem to be incorporated in the three aspects of'med­
iation as suggested iri the definition of the v~rb Ito mediate I given 
in our first footnote. 
Pressure to agree and/or audience or observer effect appears to 
correspond to the conscious provision of negative feedback. Both 
have some degree of stress attached to them. This stress or pressure 
induces energy mobilization leading to more effective communication. 
The more effective communication is achieved through 
(a) restriction of communication to the rational, objective, 
etc.; and through 
(b) increased ability to integrate and utilize information. 
I assume that this onset of effective communication will affect: 
1.) the point at which 'communication l peaks as an indication 
of 	later rejection of each other by the bargaining parties; . 
2.) the bargaining outcome in light of the number of agreements 
reached by the bargaining pair in a bargaining session. 
(See Figure F for a conceptual presentation of this relation 
between position, communication, and agreement in the context of 
med i ati on ) . 
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A, T ) B 1.) POSITION 
F.. ;­
Third Party 
Th "d' l·~ ~ lr party· lstenlng Third party talking 
--mere presence --conscious inter­
vention 
1 
 "negatite feedback" 
. (Emerson) 

Pressure to agree 
--audience or ......................... :: .... stress 
observer effect (Walton) 
(Webb et al.) ~ 
~ energy mobilization 
/ \ (Emerson) 
/ \ 2.) COMt·1UN I CATION 
Restrict communication to Increased ability to 
objective and rational .................... integrate and util·ize 
elements of the dispute information 
~d) (ltJalton) 
. . ~ effective ~/ 
communication1 (Knowles; Yager) 
-1 a ter II pea kII i n 
communication (Schacter) 
l 

-greater amount of 
communication 
"I 3.) EFFECTANCEbargaining outcome OF AN:greater number of AGREE~1ENTagreements 
+-------,...-------~------------------.. 
Conceptual Presentation of Relation Between 'Position', 'Communication ' 
and 'Agreement ' . Figure F 
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APPENDIX 
B. BARGAINING GAME INSTRUCTIONS * 
PURPOSE OF THE GAME 
You will be participating in an experimental study of bargain­
ing behavior. You can win an amount of money if you get higher total 
points than any other student playing the game after having first· 
achieved higher points than your partner. The amount of points you 
make will depend· upon your skill and effort a~ a 'bargainer ' and in 
part upon luck. An entire experimental session, not including the 
instruction period, is estimated to take about one hour. 
THE·BARGAINING GAME 
EXCHANGE 
This game involves trade and barter. Imagine that you are a 
village .chief and your village wishes to trade some of its barley 
crop to another village for some of its rice crop. Your job in the 
game is to negotiate the most favorable agreements (i.e. the most 
profitable ones) you can in behalf of your village. There are 2 
villages, each of which is represented by its chief, and there are 
4 different (hypothetical) crops involved in this exchange game. 
Each chief has two crops to trade. A chief is identified by the 
letter A or the letter B. Her crops are identified by color. 
*The amounts that are included here and the colors referred to 
are for A subjects. These were changed on the B subjects I instruc­
tions to correspond with Bls profit schedule. 
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THE PROFIT SCHEDULE 
You will have profit schedules like the model schedules found 
with these in~tructions. Your activities in the game will revolve 
around such schedules. As you read through these instructions you 
should refer often and closely to the model profit schedules. Lo'ok 
at them now. 
You should assu~e that you are A, who has red and yellow crops, 
who can trade with B, who has blue and green crops. 
1. Possible Agreement~. Notice down the left side of the 
profit schedule under the heading IIPossible Agreements"; there are 
four 'arrays of numbers. Each hori zonta 1 pai r of numbers in these 
co1umns ~ for example 21-80 or 48-53, or any other such pai r,' i s a 
possible exchange agreement you and your partner may arrive at on 
a gi yen occas; on. Numbers under the II I gi veil subhead; ng' represent 
the number of units of your crops (i.e. units of red; units of yellow) 
to be exchanged for the corresponding number of units of your cartner's 
crops (i.e. units of blue; units of green). Thus, al' transactions 
in thi s game i nvo 1ve I payment ; n ki nd I. "(ha tis, B buys some of your 
'red ' (crop) by giving you some of her 'bluel (crop) rather than 
money, or she buys some of your 'yellow' (crop) by giving you some 
of her I green I (crop). L-j kewi se, yo.u (A) buy some of B I s blue by 
gi vi ng her some of your red, or you buy some of he'r green by gi vi ng 
her some of your yellow. However, while money is not used, the 
other chief's crops have some value to you. If you get higher total 
54 
profit points than your partner, you will be able to use your profit 
points to compete for a cash prize. If you do not get higher total 
profit points then you cannot compete. The value to you of any 
given exchange agreement is indicated by the number of profit points 
associated with that agreement. 
2. Achieving Profit. Over the third column is the heading 
'MY PROFIT -- when I exchange red for blue l . Numbers in this column 
are the profit points that you can make through arriving at agree­
ments with your partner using red and blue crops. Fo~ example, on 
the model schedule for your transactions with B, if you give 37 of 
your red for 24 of Bls blue crop, you get 1 profit point~ 
Over the fourth column is the heading 'MY PROFIT -- when I 
~~change yellow for greeri l . Numbers in this column are the profit 
points that you can make through arriving at agreements with your 
partner using yellow and green crops. For example, on the model 
schedule for your transactions with B, if you give 26 of'your yellow 
for 35 of B's green crop, you get 20 profit points. Note that dif­
ferent crops (colors) have different val,ue to you. lhe profit points 
fbr various possible agreements will be different as shown in the 
different 'MY PROFIT' columns. Therefore, while trading crops you 
should always watch your profit columns as a guide during bargaining. 
Your job as chief is to maximize the profit obtained for your village. 
You might be willing to settle for 1 profit point if that is all you 
can get, for lis better than no agreement if you feel that you have 
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made more points than your partner. But your task as an effective 
bargainer is to negotiate settlements for your village that will give 
you as much profit as possible. 
Note: Suppose you exchange 28 red for 33 blue. Your profit for 
the tranSaction is 10. You will not know what your ,partner's profit 
l.S: it mi ght be 12. 
3. ~ WORD ON STRATEGY. Do not show your partner your profit 
schedule. You will not know how many profit points your partner 
obtains in an agreement, unless she tells you -- (and tells you the 
truth!) If you can guess what her true profit is then you have an· 
advantage. It is to your ,advantage to learn what her profit is, 
while at the same time deceiving her about your profit. But many 
people would rather not engage in such efforts to deceive. It is 
best to simply (a) keep your own profit schedule to yourself; 
(b) accept the best offers you can get; and (c) reject offers which 
you think can be improved. 
4. Transaction Periods: Timing the Game. There are a set of 
10 columns under the heading "TRANSACTION PERIODS" on the profit 
schedule sheet. Each of these columns corresponds to a 5 minute 
time interval (which defines a transaction period) to be measured 
by the minute hand on the alarm clock located in your room. As 
soon as the clock's minute hand enters the first period, the game 
will begin, and you may engage your partner in negotiations. The 
clock an'd transaction period columns on your schedule will help 
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you keep track of the progress of the game, and will keep you posted 
as to the current bargaining period. 
Follow these rules carefully: 
Rule i. You may make 2.!!!l two trade agreements each transac­
tion period: one exchanging red and blue crops; one exchanging 
yelJow and green crops. 
Rule 2. A trade agreement is valid only for the period during 
which it was agreed upon. 
Rule 3. Wait until the clock's minute hand enters a period 
before making agreements for that period. 
The game will be played in segments of 10 transaction periods. 
After the first 5 transaction periods (25 minutes) there will be 
a brief rest break lasting one period (5 minutes). There is a red­
colored section on the clock diagram to help you notice when to 
stop the game for a rest break. The entire experimental session will 
last 55 minutes. Thus, you have' a total of 20 opportunities to obtain 
profit during the experiment (10 exchanging red and blue; 10 exchang­
ing yellow and green). Form agreements during as many of the trans­
action periods as you can, so that (should you have higher profit 
points than your partner then) you will have attained enough points 
to bein a competitive position for the cash prize. 
5. Negot~ati.ng Exchange Agreements. When bargaining with a 
partner, converse by offering units of your color. Keep the con­
versation short and to the point, for the time is limited. There 
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are 	two concise ways to reply to an offer: 
(a) 	 I refuse your offer. 
(b) 	 I accept your offer. (Confirm ;the period of agreement, the 
terms arrived at, and record the agreement as explained in 
the section to follow.) 
Since you have only 5 minutes to make two agreements, it is a good 
idea to make efficient use of words. Agiven transaction might go, 
as follows when person A makes an offer to person B: 
A: 	 11m offering 23 red for 38 blue. 
B: 	 Sorry, but I was hopi ng for 36 red for 25 'bl ue. 
A: 	 (After checking his profit on his 36 red for 25 blue), 
O.K., we agree. That's 36 red for 25 blue, in 'period 4, 
right? 
B: 	 Right. 
6. E!9prdin,g Agreements. Notice on each schedule the columns 
which represent transaction periods. If you form an agreement during' 
period 2, giving 31 red for 30 blue, then put 31 R/30 8 in column 2 (7) 
(in the column under 2 which is entitled 'R for 81). If you form an 
. 	 ' 
agreement during period 2 by exchanging yellow for green, record it 
under column 2 (in the column under 2 which is entitled Iy forG I ). 
Note: an agreement is valid (for later consideration in total 
profit points) only if both parties to an agreement have made accu­
rate 	records in the columns on their profit schedule sheet. 
-- --
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7. Use of Rest Periods. Use the rest period after each set 
of 5 transaction periods to total and record: (a) the number of 
profit points, and (b) the number of agreements made during that 
segment of the game. DO NOT TALK TO EACH OTHER DURING THIS TIME! 
Notice at the top of each model schedule the headings, "First half-
houris profit is in agreements ll and IIsecond haif-hourls 
, 
prof; t ; s __ ; n __ agreements II • Record profi t and agreement 
totals in these spaces. If during the rest period you do not have 
enough time to total your profit points, just leave it and after 
the entire session is done you will have lots of time. 
8. Rem; nder of the Res t Peri od. I will send one of the students 
helping me in at the halfway point (after the first 5 transacticin 
periods) to remind you that this is a rest period. She ~i11 also 
adjust, the taperecorder'and begin it agairt for the next half of 
the session. This person may remain for the next 5 transact~on 
periods or'she may not. To avoid wasting time, we would ask you not 
to talk to the person who comes in to remind you of the rest period. 
9. Payment. By parti'c'ipating in this 'study you may win $10.00, 
$8.00, or $5.00. Your chance of winning depends in part upon your 
bargaining and in part upon 1uck~ You must get total points greater 
than your partner before you will be considered for the cashprize. 
Thus, you may not want to make an agreement if you think your part­
ner's profit points for that agreement are higher than yours. 
• 
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10. Recording Conversations. Since we are interested in learn­
ing how people bargain, we will b~ recording your conversations. 
(Recording will also be used for validating transactions made.) 
60 

I have R~D and YELLOW. 
She has BLUt and GREEN. First half-houris 
I'can exchange RED for BLUE. profit is 
I can exchange YELLOW for GREEN. in agreements. 
POSSIBLE Al:it{t:.t.MtNI~ TRANSACTION PERIODS 
. 
The no. of The no. of MY PROFIT MY PROFIT 1 2 3 4 
red or yellow blue or green when I when I 
"I give ll II she gives" exchange exchange R ; Y R : y R : y R : Y 
I I 1 I to her to me RED for BLUE YELLOW for forlfor for :for for Ifor for-for 
GREEN B : G BIG B : G B G 
. I I II I I 
. 
1 60 37 45 I I I I , 
2 59 36 44 1 I I I 
3 58 35 43 I 1 I 1 
4 57. 34 42 I I I I 
5 56 33 41 I I I I 
6 55 32 40 I I I I 
7' 54 31 39 I I I I 
a 53 30 38 I I 
-
I I I 
9 52 29 37 I I I I 1 I 
10 51 28 36 I 1 I I 1 I 
11 50 27 35 I I 1 i I f 
12 49 26 34 I I I I I 1 
13 48 25 33 I I I I I I 
14 47 24 32 1 1 I I I .' I 
15 46 23 31 1 I I 1 I I I 
16 45 22 30 1 I 1 I I I I I 
17 44 21 29 I . I I I I I .1 I 
18 43 20 28 I I I I I 1 I I 
19 42 19 27 I 1 I I I I I I 
20 41 18 26 I I • "I I I I 
21 40 17 25 I I . I I I I I I 
22 39 61 . 24 I 1 I I 1 I I .. 
23 38 15 23 1 I " I 1 1 I 1 
24 37 14 22 I 1 I I I I I I 
25 36 13 21 I I I I 1 1 I I 
26 35 12 20 I I 1 I I ,­ I I 
27 34 II 19 I I , I I I I 
-28 33 10 18 I I I I I I I I 
29 32 9 17 1 I I 1 I I / I 
I I I I I / • 
I 
I r I I 
I I 1 I I / I 1 
1 I I I 
I I I I 1 I I I 1 . I' ': I I 
60 1 -22 -14 1 I I I' I I I I 
I I I I 
I I· I I L 
(See p. 62 for right side of profit schedu1~) 
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r have BLUE and GREEN. 

$he Has RED and YELLOW. 
 First half-houris 

I can exchange BLUE for RED. 
 profit is 

I can exchange GREEN for YELLOW. 
 in agreements. 
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Second half-houris 
profit is 
in agreements. 
TRANSACTION PERIODS 
5 
. 
6 7 8 9 10 
: i i i 
I I I I 
I I I 
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